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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DON GERALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE. as
Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
·
Defendant-Appellant,
JAMES ALLEN SCOTT, by and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, Erma Lee Scott,
Plaintiff. Respondent,
VS.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, as
Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,
JEANETTE WALTON, Administratrix of
the Estate of Robert Walton, Deceased,
Plain ti ff-Respondent,
VS.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, as
Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,

Case
No.
11753

BOYD SIMMONS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, as
Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant-Appellant,
ANGELO MELO, WAULSTINE McNEELY and
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, as
Administrator of the State Insurance Fun,
Defendant-Appellant

Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaini:iffs demand the State Insurance Fund
bear its share proportionately as its interest appears,
of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs in
1

recovering from third parties, sums paid to or for
plaintiffs by the Fund for medical and hospital expenses and for compensation for injuries occasioned
by on-the-job accidents caused by such third parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs received Summary Judgment by JVIemorandum Decision based upon agreed facts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respondents seek affirmation of the
District Court judgment and a determination that
costs as v;ell as attorney fees are reimbursable.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant accurately states the facts, i. e., that
plaintiffs received on-the-job injuries; they received
medical payments and compensation from the State
Insurance Fund; they pressed claims against third
parties responsible for their injuries, made recovery
and reimbursed under protest or allmved under protest payment to the Fund which refused to pay any
portion of attorneys' fees and costs; they brought
suit after the decision in lVorthen v. Shurtleff, 19
Utah 2nd 80, 426 P2d 223 against the Utah State
Department of Finance as Adn1inistrator of the State
Insurance Fund for reimbursement of defendant's
share proportionately of such costs and attorneys'
fees.
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The amounts paid, dates of payment and the
fact of payment (or allowing payment) under protest are not in dispute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY ITS FAIR SHARE
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
A.

On principles of contribution irrespective
of any statute.

On ordinary principles of contribution, each recipient of benefits from the third party law suit ought
to bear his share of the burdens of such suit.
18 AM Jur 2nd Contribution expresses this concept as follows:

1. Generally; definitions.
The principle or doctrine of contribution
is one of equality in bearing a common burden. Contribution has been defined as a payment made by each person, or by any of several persons, having a common interest or liability, of his share in the loss suffered or in
the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the others. The right of contribution has also been variously described as
the right of one who has discharged a common
liability or burden, to recover of another, also
liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to
pay or bear; as the right enjoyed by a person
who is jointly liable with others and has paid
§
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more than his proper share in discharge of the
joint liability to force them to reimburse him
to the extent of their liability; and as an equity which arises when one of several parties
liable on a common debt discharges the obligation for the benefit of all.
In accordance with these definitions, the
general rule is that one who is compelled to
pay or satisfy the whole or to bear more than
his just share of a common burden or obligation, upon which several persons are equally
liable or which they are bound to discharge,
is entitled to contribution against the others
to obtain from them payment of their respective shares. In other words, when any burden
ought, from the relationship of the parties or
in respect of property held by them, to be
equally borne and each party is in aequali
jure, contribution is due if one has been compelled to pay more than his share. The doctrine is founded not upon contract, but upon
principles of equality, and assists in the fair
and just division of losses, preventing unfairness and injustice. And since the doctrine of
contribution has its basis in the broad principles of equity, it should be liberally applied.
The same principle was enunciated in VVorthen
v. Shurtleff, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426, P2d 223 at 83, the
court saying:
"Where each of the parties has the right
to bring the action and one takes the initiative
and obtains recovery for the benefit of both,
it is only fair that each bear his share of the
expenses necessarily incurred in doing so."
4

B. The Statute requires reimbursement.
The statute involved is 35-1-62 UCA 1953 and
reads as follows:

vVhen an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment,
the injured employee, or in case of death his
dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance
carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall
become trustee of the cause of action against
the third party and may bring and maintain
the action either in its own name or in the
name of the injured employee, or his heirs
or the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without
the consent of the commission.
If any recovery is obtained against such
third person it shall be disbursed as follows:

( 1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid
and charged proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear.
(2) The person liable for compensation
payments shall be reimbursed in full for all
payments made.
( 3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in case of death,
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to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
In interpreting the statute, this court in lVorthen v. Shurtleff, supra, an identical case, said:
"The basic purpose of this statute is that
of making an equitable arrangement between
an injured employee, and an insurer (or employer) who pays him workmen's compensation, with respect to a cause of action against
a third party who injures the employee. It
preserves the action to the employee, but it
prevents him from having double recovery
by requiring him to reimburse the insurer.
It also gives the insurer the right to bring
the action, but allows it only to reimburse itself and then pay any balance to the employee.
Where each of the parties has the right
to bring the action and one takes the initiative and obtains a recovery for the benefit of
both, it is only fair that each bear his share
of the expenses necessarily incurred in doing
so. That this is the meaning intended in paragraph ( 1) seems unmistakably clear. In providing that if recovery is obtained against the
third party the expenses including attorney's
fees shall be charged 'proportionately against
the parties as their interests may appear,' it
is to be noted that those terms could not apply
to the two parties to the original action (plaintiff Worthen and defendant Shurtleff and Andrews) because Worthen receives the money
from Shurtleff and Andrews, who have no further interest in it after paying it over. Therefore, the only possible 'parties' who have 'interests' in the money are VVorthen and The
6

State Insurance Fund (the latter being entitled to reimbursement.) It thus follows that
Sec. ( 1 ), with unmistakably clarity requires
that the expenses and attorney's fees be charged proportionately against these 'parties'
(Worthen and The State Insurance Fund)
as their 'interests' appear. It is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended
this application of the statute which comports
with its equitable purpose than one which
would bring about a contrary result.
In addition to the equitable result arrived at by giving priority to paragraph ( 1) as
we have discussed above, there is another persuasive consideration which supports that conclusion. When a statute undertakes an allocation of funds, the sequence in which it does
so should be regarded as having some significance. This perhaps would be plainer if the
statute had stated that the funds recovered
should be disbursed 'first,' 'second,' and 'third.'
However, the intent shown thereby is not
necessarily different from the priority of allocation which would be indicated by using the
numerals ( 1 ) , (2), and ( 3) . If we do as the
statute says and make the allocation provided
for in paragraph ( 1) first, that is, charging
the recovery with the costs and attorney's fees
in proportion to the interests of the parties, the
disbursement stated first is made first, and has
priority over the provision for disbursements
which follovvs it in paragraph (2). Then the
reimbursement to the insurer is made from the
funds remaining and to extent possible after
the first requirement for disbursement is complied with. This application of the statute can
be reconciled with the requirement that the
insurer be 'reimbursed in full by regarding
that phrase simply meaning reimbursement
for its full share after the prior requirement
7

of the statute is fulfilled, and that the insurer
cannot be compelled to take less than its proportionate share in any compromise or settlement arranged by others."
In overruling the earlier case of !HcConnel v.
Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P 2d
394, the court said, Page 84:
We have so concluded cognizant of McConnell v. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah
2d 395, 375 P2d 394, in which the insurance
carrier was not made a party, but in so far
as this case may be inconsistent with McConnell, that case is overruled. Consistent with our
holding here, see Charles Seligman Distributing Co. v. Brown (Ky.), 360 S.W.2d 509, 511.
That case is directly in point and supports plaintiffs' position here. The injured workman sued a
Third Party and recovered damages. The Kentucky
statute provides that the employee has to reimburse
the employer or his insurer for the amount paid out
as compensation. Reversing two prior cases the Court
stated and held:
" ... Moreover, regardless of the respective amounts recovered, where the employer
or its insurer has a reasonable opportunity to
intervene in the employee's action against the
Third Party tortfeasor, but chooses not to do
so it would be inequitable to require the employee to bear the attorney fees on that portion of the recovery which K.R.S. 342.055
obliges him to pay over to the employer or its
insurer . . . " Supra at 510.
8

In McConnell vs. The Commission of Finance
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 Pac. 2d 394, 1962, an earlier
case, The Utah Supreme Court declined to require
the fund to pay its proportionate share of attorney's
and costs because the Insurance Fund was not made
a party, the court saying, page 396:
"If an insurance carrier initiates an action
under this statute against the third party, or
its made a party in an action initiated by the
injured employee, any attorney's fees incurred by it would fall within the priority provided in sub-section 1 (of the statute), however in the instant case the State Insurance
Fund was not a party to the action and did
not insure any legal expenses."

The court there took a narrow view of the word
"party" and should have taken a broad view as in
Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F2 CA Calif. where
the court defines the word "party" as follows:
"In its broadest meaning the word party
includes one concerned with, conducting, or
taking part in any matter or proceeding,
whether he is named or participates as formal
party or not."
C.

There is no problem of retroactive appli-

cation.
Defendant contends application of the Worthen
case rule would be retroactive therefore, unfair. Yet
in the Worthen case the contribution rule was applied in 1967 to funds obtained between 1964 and

9

1967 in suit on a December 2, 1964 accident, thus the
application was similar to that requested here.
The only difference is that in the Worthen case
the funds vvere held by the court and here they were
paid, or the Fund allowed to obtain same under
protest; and the law would never shy from this slight
inconvenience.
Defendant asserts that the Worthen case changed the law so that contribution could only be granted on cases arising after the \IV orthen decision, and
this despite the fact that the vVorthen case itself was
applied retroactively.
It vvould seem that the \V orthen case declared
what the law had always been, it being the general
rule as stated in numerous cases in 10 ALR 3d 1371,
that the judicial ruling of a precedent has both prospective and retroactive effect unless the overruling
decision declares that it shall have only prospective
effect.
An annotation of numerous cases involving the
application of an overruling decision is found in 10
ALR 3d 13 71. The general rule or traditional theory of the unlimited retroactive operation that has
existed for many years is stated at page 1382 as follows:
"The traditional view was that by overruling a prior decision the Court does not 'pre10

tend to make a new law, but to vindicate the
old one from misrepresentation . . . . It is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law,
but that it was not law.' Accordingly, the correct (new) rule would naturally apply to all
questions subsequently coming before the
Court, regardless of the chronolgy of the factual events from which the legal rights and
liabilities at issue arose.
"This view was founded on the notion
that a Court is merely a discoverer rather than
a maker of the law, and that a Court's earlier
decisions are mere evidences of the law and
not the law itself. Such a notion still finds expression in many decisions."
A landmark case cited as standing for this position is the case of Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29,
68 P .Ed. 54 7, 44 C. Ct. 246 Ct 924). Also there cited
as enunciating this rule are a number of Circuit
Court opinions, including three from the Tenth Circuit, Jackson v. Harris, 43 F2d 513 CC.A. 10 Okla.,
1930); Sunray Oil Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 7 F2d 962 ( C.A. 10 1945), cert.
den., 325 U.S. 861, 89 L.Ed. 1982, 65 S.Ct. 1201; and
J\,1assaglia v. Commissioner 286 F2d 258 CC.A. 10
1961). In Sunray Oil Company, the Court speaking
through Chief Judge Phillips said:
"It is a general rule that the decisions of
the highest appellate court of a jurisdiction
overruling a former decision is retrospective
in its operation. In effect, it declares that the
former decision never was law."
11

See also Ragghianti v. Sherwin, 196 Cal. App.
2d 345, 16 Cal. Rpt. 583 ( 1961); Legg's Estate v.
C.I.R., 114 F2d 760 CC.A. 4, 1940); Peterson v. John
Hancock lHutual Insurance Company, 116 F2d 148
CC.A. 8, 1940).
Defendant, in its memorandum cites several
cases, which, while acknowledging this general rule,
indicates an exception thereto, where a contract has
been entered into in reliance upon a Legislative enactment as it was construed by earlier decisions. The
cases cited by defendant involve situations where
bonds or similar contractual obligations had been
issued or incurred based directly upon a decision
upholding a statute, which decision was subsequently overruled. The court properly in those situations
held that the contractual obligation that was entered into between the parties in reliance on such prior
decision should not be disturbed by the later overruling decision. It is respectfully submitted that any
such exception to the general rule of retroactivity
has no application in this present case, because the
plaintiff and defendant never entered into any contracts of any kind and because the rights and obligations between them arise out of the contribution
principle as enunciated by the terms of the Utah
statute.

12

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE TIMELY.
A.

The Statute of Limitations is not a bar.

The district court in deciding the instant case,
with regard to the Statute of Limitations, said:
"I am also of the opinion that the four
year statute of limitations of Section 78-12-25,
UCA 1953, applies, since I consider that the
action is based upon a contract for services
rendered rather than an action for a liability
created by statute (Section 78-12-26-3-year
statute) or against an officer who is a tax collector (Section 78-12-31-6-month statute).
"The file in each case reflects that the respective plaintiffs have each filed his complaint
within the four-year period from the date the
funds were paid to the state to reimburse the
State Insurance Fund, and, in my opinion, the
date of such reimbursement would constitute
the date upon which the statute of limitations
would begin to run."
He is well supported by case law as summarized in 18 Am Jur 2d Contribution, as follows:
§90. Statute of limitations applicable.

Considerable contrariety exists among the
decisions as to what statute of limitations is
applicable to the right of a paying obligor
to recover contribution from his co-obligors.
Most of this appears to result from the fact
that the following different remedies are available for the enforcement of the right to contribution: an action at law on the implied
contract; a suit in equity to equalize the bur13

den which should be borne in common; procedure as successor to rights and remedies of the
creditor, where allowable; and combinations
of these remedies. A simple action for contribution by one co-obligor against another is
generally held, however, to be governed by the
statute of limitations applicable to actions based on implied contracts or those not in writing;
for purposes of limitations the action may be
regarded as one for a debt not evidenced by
writing, or as one to recover, upon an implied
promise, money paid for the defendant's benefit.
As a general rule, where contribution is
sought between parties who were co-obligors
to another upon a written contract, the statute of limitations governing is not that relating to actions founded upon such a contract
or instrument in writing, but rather that relating to contracts not in writing or to an implied promise or contract. But a statute of limitations governing actions upon contracts, express or implied, "arising out of a written
agreement," has been held applicable to such
a case. Of course, where the parties expressly
contract for the right of contribution itself,
the statute of limitations applicable to contracts in writing applies.
The origin of the action is alvvays material in
determining \vhat statute of limitations applies. 18
Am Jur 2d Contributions is helpful here:
4. Basis and Origin of Right.
The doctrine of contribution had its origin in courts of equity, upon the principle that
equality among those in aequali jure is deemed to be equity, and at first was available only
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in courts of equity. The common law has
adopted and given effect to this equitable principle, and the principle also obtains under the
civil law. Unlike the courts at common law,
however, equity resorts to no fiction of an
implied promise to contribute in case of unequal payments by co-obligors. It equalizes
burdens and recognizes and enforces the reasonable expectations of the co-obligors because
it is just and right in good morals and not because of any supposed promise between them.
The meaning of the statement, often
made, that contribution is not founded upon
contract is sometimes misapprehended. It
means only that there need not be an express
contract for the right of contribution to exist,
and that it can exist upon principles of equity
and natural justice and independently of any
contract. Under the circumstances of many
cases the right to contribution may well be
considered as resting alike upon principles of
equity and upon contract for its foundation.
The right to contribution and the legal duty to
contribute may be qualified or controlled by
agreement, or may even arise therefrom; and
in the absence of an express agreement, contribution may be enforceable on the theory of
a contract implied in law or in fact. The right
to contribution depends upon a common burden or indebtedness, and not upon the fact
that all the parties are bound in writing. An
agreement for joint liability giving a right to
and duty of contribution between parties who
are prima facie severally and successively liable upon a written instrument may be inferred from the circumstances of the case.

§5. Availability in courts of law.
Although the doctrine of contribution originated in courts of equity, it was subsequent15

ly adopted by courts of law and is now universally applied therein. In order to make the doctrine consistent with the forms, theories, and
practices of courts of law, the fiction of an
implied contract by one obligor to contribute
to another co-obligor who had been compelled
to pay more than his share of the obligation
vas adopted. From the language of the courts
it would seem that ordinarily the implied contract in such a case is one implied in law based
on the equitable obligation to equalize the
common burden, although it is doubtless true
that universal recognition of the doctrine of
contribution may well justify the view that
a contract for contribution may be implied in
fact among parties who join in undertaking
some common burden or obligation. Furthermore, since in most jurisdictions now only one
form of action, known as the "civil action,"
is substituted in place of the common - law
forms of action, formal distinctions between
forms of action and between legal and equitable actions have been abolished.; and hence
it would appear that in such jurisdictions at
least it is no longer necessary for a court to
resort to the fiction of an implied contract in
justification of an action brought before it for
contribution.
\
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As to the statute of limitations, the following
code provisions deserve consideration:
78-12-23. Within six years.
2. An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing, except those mentioned in the preceding section.
78-12-25. Within four years.
16

( 1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for
goods, wares and merchandise, and for any
article charged in a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that
action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment
is received.
( 2) An action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.
78-12-26. Within three years.
( 1) An action for waste or trespass
upon or injury to real property; provided, that
when waste or trespass is committed by means
of underground works upon any mining claim,
the cause of action shall not be deemed to
have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
78-12-26. Within three years.
( 2) An action for taking, detaining or
injuring personal property, including actions
for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in
all cases where the subject of the action is a
domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," having upon it at the time of its
loss a recorded mark or brand, if such animal
had strayed or \Vas stolen from the true owner without his fault, the cause shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the owner has
actual knowledge of such facts as would put
a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defendant.
17

( 3) An action for relief on the ground
of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
( 4) An action for a liability created by
the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state,
except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
78-12-31. Within six months.
An action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
( 1) To recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other property seized by any such
officer in his official capacity as a tax collector, or to recover the price or value of any
goods, wares, merchandise or other personal
property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or injury to, any goods,
wares, merchandise or other personal property seized, or for damages done to any person
or property in making any such seizure.
(2) For money paid to any such officer
under protest, or seized by such officer in his
official capacity, as a collector of taxes, and
which, it is claimed, ought to be refunded.
In defense of the six-year statute of limitations,
it can be said in each instance that the State Insurance Fund authorized plaintiff by writing to represent it, that there are ample memoranda to support
this and that a running dispute arose as to the mat18

ter of reimbursement. In the Scott case, the State
Insurance Fund, by letter dated February 27, 1963
(attached to the Complaint), said:
" ... You are also authorized to represent
the interests of the State Insurance Fund in
proceedings against the third parties, upon a
contingent attorney's fee of one-third of the
amount recovered if, before the introduction
of evidence in the trial, or one-third of such
recovery if obtained after the introduction of
evidence in a trial. The State Insurance Fund
is entitled to full reimbursement before Scott
shall receive any part of the recovery."
In the Williams case the May 2, 1963 letter
( R 10) to the State Insurance Fund (copy attached
to Complaint); October 22, 1964 letter, Hunt to Williams (R7); October 22, 1964 letter, Hunt to Gordon
R. Strong (R8), Attorney for third party and other
corespondence (R9, R10) in the Williams file amply substantiates a similar engagement by the Insurance Fund of plaintiffs' counsel and a similar
continuing dispute as to the matter of reimbursement
of attorney's fees.
In the Malo case, August 14, 1964 letter, State
Insurance Fund to Gayla Dean Hunt (R4), reads
in part:
"You are authorized to represent the interests of the State Insurance Fund in proceeding against the third party and his liability
insurance carrier upon the following terms:

"

19

In the McNeely case a similar letter, August
14, 1964 CR14), reads in part:
"You are authorized to represent the interest of the State Insurance Fund in proceedings against the third party . . ."
In the Roedel case, a similar letter dated October 6, 1964, ( R 19) reads in part:
"You are authorized to represent the interest of the State Insurance Fund in proceedings against the third party and his liability
insurance carrier . . ."
If the memorandum should be deemed inadequate, then, of course, the four year statute would
be applicable unless, as contended by defendant, a
three year statute should be applied. This would depend upon whether or not the cause of action is created by statute under 78-12-26.

The test is whether or not the cause of action
would exist except for the statute. In Webber v. Salt
Lake City, 120 Pac. 503, 40 Utah 221, compiled
LAWS of Utah, 1907, Sec. 282, authorized the recovery of damages to an a butting property owner by
change of an established grade on the street. The defendant contended plaintiff's cause of action arose
by reason of a statute and that the statute of limitations for statutory cause of action should apply. The
Utah Supreme Court held not so; that the cause of
action existed before and aside from and irrespective
20

of the statute in question and although the statute
delineated the same, it did not create the cause of
action and the statutory limitation provision did not
apply. The court pointed out that constitutional provisions, prior to the enactment of the statute, would
have created the cause of action, the court saying,
page 224:
"As we have pointed out, the constitutional provision existed when Section 282 was
adopted. Moreover, the right to recover damages would continue precisely the same, although section 282 were repealed. If a right
or liability-call it what you will-therefore
existed before section 282 was adopted, such
right or liability was not created by that section. Again, if the right or liability will continue in full force and effect, although that
section were repealed, such right is not even
exercised by virtue of that section. In other
words, for the purpose of an action like the
one at bar, the provisions of section 282 are
not controlling or even material."
The foregoing case is quoted in 34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions:
§ 48. Statutory
Created by Statute-

Liabilities

Where laws create special statutory proceedings, the provisions of the general law of
limitations are sometimes construed as not applying thereto. Thus, when there is no time
limit within which such special statutory proceedings shall be commenced, the courts may
construe the law as exempting the proceedings
from all limitations and may refuse to apply
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thereto a general law of limitations. It is the
rule in most jurisdictions that such proceedings
are not subject to the exceptions contained in
a general statute of limitations. However, in
most jurisdictions, the statutes of limitation
contain special provisions prescribing the time
within which actions upon liabilities created
by statute must be commenced. To come within the terms of such a provision, the liability
must be one which would not exist except for
a statute. \Vhether a statute creates by implication a cause of action, as regards the application of a statute of limitations upon a cause
of action so created, depends largely upon
whether the duty is imposed for the benefit of
a particular class of persons or whether it
merely defines, in the interest of the general
public, the degree of care to be exercised under special circumstances. A right to damages
for injuries to abutting property as a result
of the change in the grade of a street, which
is given by a Constitution, does not depend
upon a statute passed to harmonize the statutory law with the Constitution, and is not given by the statute, within the meaning of the
statute of limitations, and the fact that a duty
to pay money for work and materials which
the defendant failed to perform was a statutory one does not make the action one upon
the statute, for such an action is on assumpsit.
It has also been held that the statute of limitations applicable to a suit by a school district
which, through error in computing the apportionment of school funds, has received less
than its proportionate share, against districts
which have in consequence received more
than their share, is that relating to actions
for relief on the ground of mistake, and not
that relating to liabilities created by statute.
On the other hand, in some jurisdictions the
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limitation period pertaining to actions on statutory liabilities governs actions to enforce the
statutory liability of stockholders, and, in proper circumstances, such a provision applies to
a suit between master and servant and to proceedings for the recovery of workmen's compensation. There is a difference of opinion as
to whether an action to enforce the liability
of a surety on an administrator's bond, the giving of which is required by a statute prescribing the terms and conditions thereof, comes
within such a provision. The general rules relating to the application of the statute of limitations to actions for the recovery of penalties
are discussed in another article.
As to the purpose of the statute in question, 351-62, the language in the vVorthen case, supra, may
be helpful:
19 Utah Reports 2d Series, 1967, P.83
"The basic purpose of this statute is that
of making an equitable arrangement between
an injured employee, and an insurer (or employer) who pays him workmen's compensation, with respect to a cause of action against
a third party who injures the employee, but
it prevents him from having double recovery
by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. It
also gives the insurer the right to bring the
action, but allows it only to reimburse itself
and then pay any balance to the employee.
vVhere each of the parties has the right to
bring the action and one takes the initiative
and obtains a recovery for the benefit of both,
it is only fair that each bear his share of the
expenses necessarily incurred in doing so . ... "
Certainly, if the party injured and the State In23

surance Fund had joined in an original action for
the mutual benefit of both against the third party,
the obligation of each to bear its fair share of the
joint venture would not depend upon any statute
but upon ordinary rules governing a joint venture,
hence the cause of action for one to force the other
to contribute would not depend upon the statute but
upon other principles.
On principles of fairness it can be argued that
the statute of limitations should run only from April
7, 1967-the date the \Vorthen decision was struck,
as prior thereto a plaintiff could not effectively assert his rights.
B.
cable.

Laches and equitable estopple are inappli-

18 Am Jur 2d Contribution, reads, page 132:
Laches does not apply to an action at law
for contribution, citing Vansant v. Gardner,
240 Ky. 318, 42 SW2d 300; Friedman v. Maltinsky, 260 Pa. 312, 103 A 731, and, it has been
held, where there is concurrent jurisdiction
over contribution in law and equity, the application of the doctrine of laches must be influenced by the spirit of the law of limitations.
Where the relief sought is equitable in nature,
however, laches may sometimes bar recovery of contribution, and has been held to do
so where the claimant failed to prosecute the
claim within a reasonable time and in the lifetime of other parties who had knowledge of
the facts. It has been held that laches, and not
24

statutory limitation, applies to the right of the
paying obligor to be subrogated to the creditor's security.
As in other cases, laches in an action for
contribution is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time, although that is one of its important elements; there must be not only delay,
but delay which works a disadvantage to another, citing Vansant v. Gardner, 240 Ky 318,
42 SW2d 300.
As a general rule, laches cannot be successfully asserted unless the delay was culpable and prejudice resulted. W aldref v. Dow,
172 Minn. 52, 214 NW 767.
A delay of 7 years has been considered
not such laches as to bar relief on a bill for
contribution in equity where no prejudice was
caused thereby. Burrows v. M'Whann, 1 SC
Eq ( 1 Desauss) 409.
As to equitable estopple, the doctrine necessitates,
among other elements, a change of position or status
to the detriment or injury of the person claiming estopple. See 28 Am Jur 2d Estopple B Elements, Requisites and Grounds, page 640.
Here there is no detriment.
Neither is there reliance on conduct of the claimant, another essential element; nor conduct of the
claimant designed to or capable of misleading or
inconsistent with the position now taken; nor any
intention to mislead; or superior knowledge of the
true facts; or change of position in any way, shape or
form.
25

POINT III.
COSTS AS WELL AS ATTORNEY FEES ARE REIMBURSABLE.
The district court ordered contribution as to attorney's fees but not as to costs. vVe submit it should
have allowed costs. In the iv orthen v. Shurtleff case
supra, the award appealed from and affirmed was for
attorney's fees and costs.
Furthermore, the statute clearly contemplates
something other than attorney's fees in its reference
to" ... reasonable expense of the action including attorney's fees."
In speaking of contribution in a different facet
of the field, Am Jur aptly says (Contribution, p. 32):
""\Vhere the claimant has paid costs under
such a judgment they cannot be distinguished
from the debt and every equitable principle
·which entitles him to contribution, for the one
applies equally to the other."
Defendant asserts plaintiffs are not the proper
parties. This is refuted by the record which confirms
plaintiffs paid the sums here demanded.
In discussing parties in Contribution actions, Am
Jur 2d summarizes, p. 135:
In general, the common obligor who has
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paid more than his proportionate share of the
common obligation is the proper party plaintiff in an action for contribution; he should
sue in his own name and not in the name
of the obligee whom he has paid.
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CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiffs have brought an ordinary contribution
action where the statute, as interpreted in the \Vorthen case, clearly delineates how the third party proceeds should be allocated to the end that each party
pays the fair share of the expenses including attorney's fees. The case was really quite simple until
barnacled with assertions of equitable estopple, etc.
\Ve submit the trial court reduced the case to its proper denominator and that this court has only to decide:
1.

Does the rule in the \Yorthen case apply,

2.

\iVhich statute of limitation applies, and

3. Does contribution apply to costs as well as
attorney fees,
and vYe respectfully urge that affinnance is compelled by the law ancl the facts.
Respectfully submitted,
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